Published justifications for weighting characters in parsimony analyses vary tremendously. Some authors argue for weighting a posteriori, some for a priori, and especially those authors that rely on a falsificationist approach to systematics argue for non-weighting. To find a decision, while following the falsificationist approach, one first has to investigate the necessary conditions for the possibility of phylogenetic research to establish an empirical science sensu Popper. A concept of phylogenetic homology together with the criterion of identity is proposed, which refers to the genealogical relations between individual organisms. From this concept a differentiation of the terms character and character state is proposed, defining each character as a single epistemological argument for the reconstruction of a unique transformation event. Synapomorphy is distinguished from homology by referring to the relationship between species instead of individual organisms, thus the set of all synapomorphies constitutes a subset of the set of all homologies. By examining the structure of characteristics during character analysis and hypothesizing specific types of transformations responsible for having caused them, a specific degree of severity is assigned to each identity test. It thus provides a specific degree of corroboration for every hypothesis that successfully passed this test. Since the congruence criterion tests hypotheses of synapomorphy against each other on grounds of their degree of corroboration gained from the identity test, these different degrees of corroboration determine the specific weights given to characters and character state transformations before the cladistic analysis. This provides a reasonable justification for an a priori weighting scheme within a falsificationist approach to phylogeny. It also demonstrates the indispensable necessity of its application. The weighting of phylogenetic characters within cladistic analyses, equally or differentially, is a common and compelling procedure in systematics. The theoretical justifications for this procedure vary tremendously (Farris 1969 , Neff 1986 , Carpenter 1988 , Bryant 1989 , Goloboff 1993 , Chippindale & Wiens 1994 , Allard & Carpenter 1996 , Milinkovitch et al. 1996 , Kluge 1997b , Björklund 1999 , Källersjö et al. 1999 , Wenzel & Siddall 1999 , Broughton et al. 2000 , Lutzoni et al. 2000 . In this paper I will try to examine the conditions for the possibility of justifying a weighting scheme within a falsificationist approach to phylogeny. The effect of applying Popper's falsificationist methodology on phylogenetic inferences has been and still is extensively discussed (e.g
The weighting of phylogenetic characters within cladistic analyses, equally or differentially, is a common and compelling procedure in systematics. The theoretical justifications for this procedure vary tremendously (Farris 1969 , Neff 1986 , Carpenter 1988 , Bryant 1989 , Goloboff 1993 , Chippindale & Wiens 1994 , Allard & Carpenter 1996 , Milinkovitch et al. 1996 , Kluge 1997b , Björklund 1999 , Källersjö et al. 1999 , Wenzel & Siddall 1999 , Broughton et al. 2000 , Lutzoni et al. 2000 . In this paper I will try to examine the conditions for the possibility of justifying a weighting scheme within a falsificationist approach to phylogeny.
The effect of applying Popper's falsificationist methodology on phylogenetic inferences has been and still is extensively discussed (e.g., Farris 1970 Farris , 1979 Farris , 1983 Farris , 1995 Farris , 2000 Bock 1973; Wiley 1975; Kitts 1977; Platnick & Gaffney 1977 , 1978a , 1978b Cracraft 1978; Platnick 1979; Sober 1993; Kluge & Wolf 1993; Kluge 1997a Kluge , b, 1998 Kluge , 2001 Siddall & Kluge 1997; Rieppel 1999; Brower 2000; De Queiroz & Poe 2001) . One central statement, however, remains vague. If one wants to demonstrate that phylogenetic research is an empirical science sensu Popper, one has to show that phylogenetic hypotheses are testable, which means that they have to be open to refutation by empirical evidence. For testing, those hypotheses and all their embodied definitions should be stated as clearly and unambiguously as possible, because only precisely formulated statements can be critically discussed and severely tested (Popper 1983 : 276, 1994 . This refers to the requirement of simplicity of scientific hypotheses which is tantamount to their degree of falsifiability and their empirical content (Popper 1994: 97-105) . The number and severity of independent tests a hypothesis passes establish its corroboration, because its degree of falsifiability is directly dependent on its testability. The testability of a hypothesis is, in turn, identical with its empirical content (Popper 1983: e.g., 230f, 244f; 1994: 213, 339-373) . Thus, the degree of falsifiability sets the upper limit of the possible degree of corroboration a hypothesis can gain (Farris 1995) .
Let us focus on three different kinds of phylogenetic hypotheses and discuss whether they are suitable to serve as falsifiable hypotheses: cladistic hypotheses (tree hypotheses), synapomorphy hypotheses, and hypotheses on phylogenetic homology (sensu Roth 1984) . One has to examine whether these hypotheses are logically linked or independent of each other, and what could serve as empirical evidence and relevant background knowledge for testing them empirically in a falsificationist approach.
Cladistic and synapomorphy hypotheses are statements about descent of organisms and species. To be able to test such statements one has to have an explanation of what descent means and what species are. The theory of evolution gives such an explanation by describing different kinds of evolutionary events: reproduction, heredity, and speciation. One has to assume that such events take place and are part of the relevant background knowledge if one wants to test concrete statements of descent. But in looking for empirical evidence for cladistic and synapomorphy hypotheses one has to concede that no empirical observation clearly and unambiguously indicates how organisms are evolutionary related to one another. I cannot think of any empirical evidence that could definitely falsify such a hypothesis. Thus, neither a cladistic nor a synapomorphy hypothesis is directly testable on empirical evidence. This paper represents an attempt to find the empirical grounds for testing cladistic hypotheses. This is done by referring to the concept of homology and interpreting it from a falsificationist point of view. By examining its empirical testability and its logical linkage to hypotheses of synapomorphy, the conditions for empirical testing of cladistic hypotheses are evaluated. The investigations result in a modification of the common interpretation of the application of Popper's methodology to phylogenetic research and of the procedure of parsimony analyses of cladistic characters. As a result, the necessity of a priori weighting of cladistic characters according to the results of the character analysis is revealed.
Characteristics
If one wants to test a hypothesis against empirical evidence, the relevant area of matter (domain of discourse) has to be defined beforehand. Therefore, I will use the term "characteristic" as corresponding to an observationally distinct unit of an organism. The set of all possible characteristics then constitutes the area of matter relevant to phylogenetic hypotheses. Such a unit can represent, for instance, a morphological as well as a fossilized or molecular structure, a biochemical compound, or a specific behavior. In every case no connection to the theory of evolution shall be associated with the term "characteristic".
To be able to use characteristics of organisms as empirical evidence for statements of their history one has to explain what makes some characteristics 'historical'. Again, the theory of evolution helps. Reproduction together with heredity gives an explanation of the phenomenon of characteristics identical between parents and their offspring. Transformation by mutation (or recombination) is the type of event that explains why offspring sometimes yields new characteristics. Thus, the identity of characteristics can be explained by heredity, and their difference by transformation. Therefore, one has to include the possibility of mutations in the assumed background knowledge. This together with the other types of events -reproduction, heredity and speciation -can be summed up by the term "descent with modification". If one projects these types of events onto time one would expect to perceive organisms bearing characteristics with specific properties. These properties would link certain characteristics of one organism with certain characteristics of other organisms in terms of having an identical historical origin. This is the essence of the concept of homology.
Homology
A phylogenetic concept of homology should cover its theoretical definition and criteria for identification of homologous characteristics. The theoretical definition of homology must not contradict the assumed background knowledge. It should supply the theoretical foundation for empirical tests of hypotheses of homology and it should ascribe 'historical characteristics' to the organisms -properties which allow conclusions about the evolutionary history of those organisms. These characteristics would represent the empirical evidence against which a hypothesis of homology should be tested. The 'historical characteristics' are represented by what is called homologies and differ from the characteristics used in a purely comparative, not by any means evolutionary approach. This historical interpretation of the concept of homology is necessary for the possibility of testing hypotheses about the evolutionary past of lines of descent of organisms.
A concept of homology should assist in uncovering the linkage of the historical with the materialistic thus organismic. This is attempted by means of the theory of descent with modification, and one receives a theoretical definition of homology:
Homologous characteristics are shared character states of at least two organisms that are derived from a singular transformation/mutation event in their common ancestor.
Remarks and conclusions
(1) The definition of homology proposed here uses an "all-or-none" theoretical criterion, as Patterson (1988) calls it ("concept of quality" sensu Dover 1987), for defining the term homology. This should be distinguished from what Dover (1987) calls the "concept of quantity, as in degree of similarity".
(2) As a consequence, the expression "their common ancestor" in the above definition refers to the individual ancestral organism in which the corresponding transformation took place. In that way, the proposed definition of homology differs from the most common definition by referring to the relationships of single individuals (genealogy) rather than of species. I use this interpretation of the concept of homology because I want to get as close as possible conceptually to the empirical observations relevant to cladistic inferences, and these are, in my opinion, the empirical entities studied which are properties of individual organisms.
(3) As evolution and 'continuing change' takes place within the lines of individuals and their offspring, and since single organisms are the biological entities in space and time which we study, any effort to reconstruct their evolution should apply the concept of homology to lines of individual organisms. Therefore, it is possible to denote as homologies characteristics that are only shared by individuals of a single species (intraspecific), as long as they are derived from a singular mutation event in the common ancestor of those organisms.
(4) As hypotheses of homology refer to the pattern causing processes, it is obvious that a complete hypothesis of homology consists of two components:
a) The distribution pattern of the two character states involved (see the Phylogenetic characters section below). b) The transformation hypothesis consisting of the respective character states before and after the transformation together with the specific type of transformation-causing mutation event. Therefore, the proposed concept of homology necessarily entails some sort of taxic as well as transformational homology (see Hawkins et al. 1997 , de Pinna 1991 , Patterson 1982 .
(5) The result of a mutation event (e.g., an insertion) might function as the substrate for a subsequent mutation event, where the derived character state of an evolutionarily older character turns into the ancestral character state of an evolutionarily younger one. This is a problem concerning character transformation, hierarchy and the methodologically claimed independence of phylogenetic characters, and it is relevant to the coding of phylogenetic characters for data matrices.
For example, Haszprunar (1998) states that "there are supraspecific homologous structures based on clearly orthologous genes (e.g., cerebral eyes in metazoans, limbs of arthropods and vertebrates) which are certainly not synapomorphies (e.g., Nilsson 1996 , Shubin et al. 1997 ". When applying the proposed definition of homology, one has, in principle, no problem interpreting this phenomenon without contradiction. The gene in its totality does not necessarily represent a homologous character state. Instead, it most probably is a composite character state (see Fig. 6 ), especially if it is not 100% identical. One cannot exclude that it is the result of more than a single mutation event. In this case, it is possible that the gene shares a common origin with all Metazoa in the sense that it (partly) evolved in their common ancestor, which would not be equal to a totally homologous property of such a characteristic. Subsequent mutations within the different clades of the Metazoa probably changed the function of that gene. These mutations then resulted in 'new' homologies (limbs of arthropods and limbs of vertebrates).
(6) With this definition it is possible to apply the term homology also for 'loss' character states (contradicting Haszprunar 1998 , de Pinna 1991 . 'Loss' character states, however, cannot be identified prior to the cladistic analysis; this can only be done when interpreting the character state distribution of a rooted most parsimonious tree.
(7) The definition explains the need for a conditional phrase ("homologues as what?") for every homology statement (Bock 1969 (Bock , 1973 Patterson 1982 ). This conditional phrase is needed to link the historical (the hypothesized mutation event) to the organismic (the observable characteristics). This is done by referring to the common ancestor of the two or more organisms under comparison, and to the single mutation which took place in this ancestral organism. The use of this conditional phrase, which refers to a specific transformation event, makes a hypothesis of homology empirically testable and the distinction of character and character state not only plausible but necessary (see also de Pinna 1991, Hawkins et al. 1997; contradicting: Bock 1973 , Wiley 1981 , Schoch 1986 , Ax 1987 , Patterson 1988 .
Phylogenetic characters
Homology links identical characteristics of different organisms historically by referring to them as to the product of a transformation caused by a mutation event in a common ancestor, inherited by them via a line of reproduction. A transformation is recognizable only by per-ceiving a difference in a condition found before and after the transformation.
An unequivocal interpretation of the terms "character" and "character state" could be the following:
What we perceive by empirical observations of organisms are only character states. As Hennig (1966: 89) states: Character states "are 'characters ' in the sense that they distinguish their bearers from one another, but we must always be aware of the fact that 'characters ' that can be compared are basically only character conditions ... produced by transformation." As a consequence, a character, or better a phylogenetic character, cannot itself be called homologous since it represents only a hypothesis about which units (character states) should be compared. The term phylogenetic character somehow represents the 'position' within the organism where the mutation occurs, and its corresponding transformation. A phylogenetic character always includes the conditions before and after a transformation. Therefore, a phylogenetic character is always a phylogenetic hypothesis (Neff 1986 ). The two conditions, the character states, are qualitatively different, and are distinguishable as "ancestral" and "derived", of which only the derived can be denoted as being homologous when shared by at least two organisms. Therefore, a single phylogenetic character is only a single argument and as such can only provide evidence for the homology of the derived character state of the hypothesized transformation. Independent of this fact, it is possible that the ancestral character state of one phylogenetic character represents the derived and thus homologous character state of another phylogenetic character (see Remarks and conclusions (5) above, p. 321). Its homology statement, however, is part of the argument of the latter and not the former phylogenetic character.
This conclusion differs from the common usage of the term homology and is much more strict. Composite phylogenetic characters that also contain ancestral details, or that are ancestral all together, are often also called homologies (Wägele 1996) . However, this practice would weaken both the historical aspect of the proposed concept and the testability of hypotheses of homology, and is therefore rejected (see Complexity section below). One would also have difficulties in stating a single conditional phrase for the homology statement of such a composite character state, which would represent the result of more than a single transformation.
Furthermore, the concepts of "phylogenetic character" and "character state" advocated here use the two terms as representing units of evolutionary processes (as used by, e.g., Lloyd & Calder 1991) . It must be distinguished from a different concept that uses the two terms as representing (smallest) units of observation (e.g., Giribet & Wheeler 1999) , which are called "characteristics" within the present paper.
For the identification of the corresponding character states that belong to a single phylogenetic character, two of the three criteria of Remane (1952) should be applied: similarity of topographical position, that is the "criterion of position", and similarity of ontogenetic constraints, the "criterion of continuity" (although the latter is only applicable to morphological characteristics). These have to be applied to make it possible to state a hypothesis of topographical correspondence (Rieppel 1988) of two or more different character states, also called the hypothesis of 'positional homology' (Swofford et al. 1996, Titus and Frost 1996) , 'topographic homology' (Jardine 1969) , or 'provisional homology' (Giribet & Wheeler 1999) . The latter three terms are ambiguous, however, and therefore in a way unsuitable, because a hypothesis of 'positional/topographic/provisional' homology is not a hypothesis of a homology according to the applied definition (which on this point agrees with Rieppel 1988 and Brower & Schawaroch 1996) . A topographic correspondence merely provides the characteristics that shall be compared, which represent something like homolocalities. Therefore, the term "topographical correspondence" is preferred, which does not necessarily need an evolutionary framework -Aristoteles already stated hypotheses of topographical correspondence when giving characteristics of different organisms the same name.
In this sense a phylogenetic character represents a hypothesis of topographical correspondence consisting of two different character states of which one is interpreted as representing a hypothesis of homology, rendering a phylogenetic character a phylogenetic hypothesis.
Testing homology: identity
A criterion for identification of homologous characteristics has to fulfil the following conditions:
(1) It helps to distinguish between homologous and non-homologous characteristics.
(2) It does not contradict the assumed background knowledge that is descent with modification; rather, it is deducible from it and from the theoretical definition of homology.
(3) It offers the opportunity for severe tests of a hypothesis of homology, thereby rendering phylogenetic inference an empirical science.
Assuming that reproduction, heredity and transformation are the only types of evolutionary events taking place in time, one can conclude the following: if a character state X of organism A is transformed by a mutation and inherited by the offspring of A without any subsequent transformation of X, and if the offspring reproduces without any subsequent transformation of X, then it holds true that X is identical for all descendants of A which inherited X.
Characteristics of two or more organisms that originated in only a single mutation event in their common ancestor should be identical. Thus, a homologous characteristic is characterized by its identity over all organisms bearing this characteristic. Characteristics of two organisms that do not have identical inheritable properties cannot have the same origin and can therefore not be explained by a single transformation, respectively. Therefore, identity is the test criterion for every hypothesis of homology. This criterion forms the basis for the test of any hypothesis of homology. It is applied a priori, before the construction of a cladogram. As a consequence, hypotheses of homology are principally falsifiable.
Homologous character states have to be identical if they are the result of the same single mutation event. The term "identity" is unambiguously applicable with nucleotide sequence data since this type of data is one-dimensional (Woese 1987 ) -at least as long as one does not consider any possible secondary structures of the molecule as a character state. Regarding morphological data this does not apply. However, one could still recognize morphological characteristics that share identical 'qualities' -identical structural properties called 'homomorphies' -even if their surficial shapes are not identical. In this case, only the identical quality of the morphological characteristic -e.g., a single structural aspect of it -represents the empirical evidence and the basis for stating a hypothesis of homology.
Some authors claim that hypotheses of homology cannot be subjected to severe tests but can only be estimated (e.g. Haszprunar 1998). They assign a relative probability of homology, and hence distance themselves from the "all-or-none" theoretical criterion. It is true that there is no such thing as a decisive test which could result in a conclusive "yes" or "no". But this holds true for any empirical hypothesis since there is no basis for verifying any kind of empirical statement (Popper 1983) . Still, there is an empirical basis which helps to decide which of all the possible hypotheses of homology are to be preferred in light of the present empirical knowledge, and this lies in the different explanatory powers of the competing hypotheses. The explanatory power of a hypothesis depends on the outcome and the number and severity of independent tests the hypothesis passed, and thus its degree of corroboration (Popper 1983 (Popper , 1994 .
Although the importance of character analysis a priori to cladistic analysis has been stressed by many authors (e.g., Neff 1986 , Bryant 1989 , Wägele 1994 , Haszprunar 1998 , it is often overlooked that characters and character states which are used in the cladistic analysis are already hypotheses themselves and that they had been subject to tests a priori the cladistic analysis (Neff 1986 ) -tests like the one using the criterion of identity.
The criterion of identity indeed provides the basis for a test (like similarity in Patterson 1982 , Rieppel 1988 contradicting de Pinna 1991) which is more or less severe, depending on the type of character. Most of all the hypotheses of homology that are theoretically possible in the light of the background knowledge fail this test when exposed to the experience gained in the character analysis.
It is possible that not all homologies in the sense of the definition pass this empirical test. The test is, however, still necessary if homology should be more than a plain theoretical concept which is empirically empty.
One could think of a set of characteristics that are homologous in the sense of the definition. When applying the test, subsets of this set are constituted (Fig. 1) . The subsets consist on one hand of those hypotheses of homology that are of use for phylogenetic inference because of their high empirical content (because of the existence of a certain amount of potential falsifiers), and on the other hand of those that are of no use because they cannot be tested (because they lack a sufficient amount of potential falsifiers). They thus consist of phylogenetically informative and non-informative characters, respectively.
Synapomorphy
In which way are homology and synapomorphy logically linked to one another?
A synapomorphy is a character state shared by two taxa, that is derived from a singular transformation event in their common ancestor, the stem species of the two taxa (Hennig 1966 , Ax 1987 . The two taxa constitute sister taxa.
While homology is a concept that focuses on the organismic level and the history of reproductive lines of individual organisms, synapomorphy is a concept that is applicable on the species level, thus focusing on the history of lines of species.
According to the definition of synapomorphy stated above, a homologous characteristic shared only by organisms of a single species (intraspecific) cannot represent a synapomorphy, since a synapomorphy must be shared by at least two species (interspecific). And even if a homologous characteristic is shared by two or more species, it does not necessarily have to represent a synapomorphy. One could think, for instance, of the following scenario which is perfectly consistent with the theory of evolution (for an illustration see Fig. 2 ): consider a species X which by geological activities has been split into two populations. The latter are potentially cross-fertile, but because of a topographic barrier there is no gene flow between them. In one population a mutation occurs leading to the transformation of a characteristic ( Fig. 2 : from "square" to "circle"). In exactly the same population another transformation takes place splitting this population into two parts which are reproductively isolated, constituting a speciation. This speciation event gives rise to the two species C and Y. At this point in the scenario, one would thus observe species C with a single population. Its individuals bear the newly transformed characteristic ("circle"). Furthermore, one would observe species Y with two populations which are geographically separated but potentially cross-fertile. Individuals of one of the two populations bear the newly transformed characteristic ("circle") and those of the other population the ancestral characteristic ("square"), although they both belong to the same species Y. In another step of this scenario, a speciation event takes place in species Y, producing species A and B. Consequently, the scenario ends with three species, of which A and B represent sister taxa and the adelphotaxon of C. The "circle"characteristic is a homology between individuals of species B and C. However, it does not represent a synapomorphy, because species B and C are not sister taxa.
One can thus conclude that a given homology is not necessarily also a synapomorphy, but that any synapomorphy is always also a homology. The set of all synapomorphies is, therefore, a subset of the set of all homologies and, logically speaking, homology as defined in this paper cannot be equivalent to synapomorphy (contradicting Patterson 1982 , de Pinna 1991 , Brower & Schawaroch 1996 .
In correspondence with the term "phylogenetic character", which refers to a transformation event leading to a homologous character state, the term "cladistic character" is introduced. A cladistic character is a hypothesis of a transformation event which has led to a synapomorphic character state. In this sense, only cladistic characters bear information on the evolutionary relationship of species. They are a subset of the set of phylogenetic characters, which also bear information on the evolutionary relationship of individual organisms.
Testing synapomorphy: congruence
As a consequence, one is confronted with the question whether an empirical criterion exists to distinguish synapomorphies from non-synapomorphies.
If one considers the evolutionary events of reproduction, heredity and mutation together with speciation and projects them onto time, one can expect the distribution pattern of apomorphic character states between species to be structured hierarchically. This distribution pattern serves as evidence for nested groupings of species characterized by sharing specific apomorphic character states. Furthermore, those groupings have to be congruent with one another. Hence, synapomorphic character states are not randomly distributed. This criterion is called "congruence" (Patterson 1988 , de Pinna 1991 , Lipscomb 1992 , Kluge 1997a ; equivalent to "criterion of coincidence" of Wagner 1986) .
With this criterion, hypotheses of synapomorphy can only be tested against other hypotheses of synapomor- phy while applying the logical sentence of contradiction and the methodological sentence of parsimony. In a nutshell: if there are two different character states hypothesized as being synapomorphic and their distribution within the species classifies two contradicting sets, at least one of those hypotheses must be wrong in the light of the background knowledge. Thus, at least one of them must be reinterpreted ad hoc as being homoplasious (Kluge 1997a (Kluge , 1998 or homologous, but not synapomorphic. Thus, if a set of hypotheses of synapomorphy fails to pass the congruence test, the entire set is falsified -not all of the hypotheses can be true in the light of the background knowledge. In terms of testability: the more parsimonious the hypothesized species relationships and character state optimizations are, the better (Farris 1970 , and see below). Thus, only sets of hypotheses of synapomorphy are principally falsifiable at this level of inference -single hypotheses of synapomorphy cannot be tested by the congruence test. Many authors call hypotheses of homology that pass this test 'secondary homology' (e.g., de Pinna 1991; equivalent to 'homology' sensu Rieppel 1988; see also 'corroborated homology' of Brower & Schawaroch 1996) ; but interpreting the congruence criterion more strictly, it is actually not homology that is tested, but synapomorphy.
From these tested hypothetical synapomorphies a cladogram is derived (Bock 1973) . The cladogram which results from a parsimony analysis represents the optimum fit for the hypotheses of synapomorphy within a frame of a hierarchical character state distribution in terms of parsimony, constituting the presently most corroborated cladistic hypothesis. This reveals the logical linkage between the three different types of phylogenetic hypotheses mentioned above: the hypotheses of homology and synapomorphy, and the cladistic hypotheses. Furthermore, it explains the central role of the concept of synapomorphy for cladistic analyses. The fact that the step from tested homologies to tested synapomorphies is not a trivial one is, for instance, illustrated by the lineage sorting and the gene-tree/species-tree problem (e.g., Page & Charleston 1997) .
For effectively performing the congruence test, the amount of hypotheses of homology that are no synapomorphies and that pass the first test must be minimal, so that one can reasonably test the logical consistency of sets of hypotheses of synapomorphy.
Since synapomorphies are always homologies, the identity test is also a test of hypotheses of synapomorphy. Only those synapomorphy hypotheses that successfully pass this test may take part in the congruence test.
The outcome of the cladistic analysis is not independent of the results of the test of identity, and therefore also not independent of the character analysis (see also Neff 1986 ). This is due to the fact that the tested hypotheses of synapomorphy themselves, together with the methodological criterion of parsimony and the logical sentence of contradiction, are the basis for this analysis. Parsimony is needed, because without it there would be no methodological criterion which would help in choosing which of the alternative sets of hypotheses that passed the congruence test should be preferred -if an ad hoc reinterpretation of hypotheses is necessary, there is always more than one alternative reinterpretation which will pass the congruence test. If two or more sets of hypotheses of synapomorphy are congruent, parsimony prefers the set of hypotheses that has the highest sum of degrees of corroboration gained in the identity test. That is the reason why the results of the test of identity have to be employed in the test of congruence.
Because of the methodological principle of parsimony (meant to include not necessarily only the cladistic method of Maximum Parsimony), there is no non-weighting of characters in a cladistic analysis (contradicting, e.g., Kluge 1997a). It also explains why one has no choice but to weight cladistic characters in a cladistic analysis, equally or differentially. The function of parsimony within this test is not primarily to minimize the requirements for ad hoc hypotheses of homoplasy for the most parsimonious hierarchy, but to maximize its degree of corroboration within the given setting of evidence, hypothesis and background knowledge (contradicting Kluge 1997a, b; Farris 1983) and to minimize the corroboration for all character transformations that have to be interpreted ad hoc as homoplasies. The total degree of corroboration of the cladistic hypothesis is not only dependent on the number of ad hoc hypotheses of homoplasy, but also on the results of the first and the second test.
Hence, for inferring the cladistic hypothesis with the maximum explanatory power it is necessary to include the degrees of corroboration of every single hypothesis of synapomorphy, because they constitute the degree of corroboration of the cladistic hypothesis. Minimizing the number of ad hoc hypotheses is not sufficient in that context. This is the only but decisive theoretical reason for weighting characters and character state transformations differentially a priori to the cladistic analyses in a refutationist program of cladistic research. Only in the case of different degrees of corroboration of hypotheses of synapomorphy which have successfully passed the first test is it necessary to give them differential weights before they are subjected to the second test (in contradiction to Kluge 1997a, b) .
Thus, weighting characters is not a question of estimating some intrinsic quality of the character (Neff 1986 ) in an essentialist manner, but a question of the degree of corroboration of hypotheses of synapomorphy gained in the character analysis.
It should be mentioned that neither of those two tests is truly decisive (see also Patterson 1988; Kluge 1997a Kluge , 1998 , because not only synapomorphies/homologies but also convergences can be identical. As a consequence, identical convergences would pass the first test and could also be congruent with other hypotheses of synapomorphy, which would mean that they would also pass the second test.
If the identity test is not interpreted as a test of synapomorphy or homology (see de Pinna's 1991 similarity criterion), the congruence test together with parsimony would not constitute an empirical test in cladistic analyses. Because the congruence test and the principle of parsimony test hypotheses against hypotheses on the basis of their specific degrees of corroboration, they all together have to have passed an empirical test beforehand, as their degree of corroboration would otherwise equal zero. And no matter how many hypotheses of synapomorphy contradict a single other hypothesis -if they all have zero corroboration one has no basis for deciding which of the two sets of hypotheses is to be preferred. It is zero versus zero. This is due to the fact that the congruence test is no direct empirical test but a test against the consistency of all hypotheses in question. If this test shall indirectly be an empirical test, the tested hypotheses must have gained explanatory power beforehand. This explanatory power is obtained by successfully passing the identity test.
A supplementary objection remains to be stated: the quality of the hypotheses of topographical correspondence also influences the degree of corroboration of the involved hypotheses of synapomorphy which have passed the identity test, and it might also represent another factor that has to be taken into consideration when evaluating weights of phylogenetic characters and character state transformations.
How to weight
"The wish to grade hypotheses according to the tests passed by them is legitimate: I do not know of any serious objection" (Popper 1983: 220 ).
Popper's hypothetico-deductive approach consists of three elements: background knowledge, hypothesis and empirical evidence (Fig. 3) .
The background knowledge (Popper 1983 (Popper , 1994 ) is relevant knowledge that is accepted, while the hypothesis is tested. It may include initial conditions. The important point is that the background knowledge has to be consistent with the hypothesis (Popper 1983: 236) . From this background knowledge one can deduce a logical set of all theoretically possible empirical statements that do not contradict the chosen background knowledge. The empirical hypothesis is the hypothesis one wants to test. It must not contradict the background knowledge. If one deduces the theoretically possible empirical statements 326 Vogt
Org. Divers. Evol. (2002) that are consistent with the conjunction of background knowledge and hypothesis, one receives a subset of the former set. This subset includes all empirical statements that are predicted by the hypothesis ('predictions' or 'retrodictions'). Those statements that only belong to the former set, and that thus contradict the hypothesis but not the background knowledge, constitute the set of potential falsifiers of the hypothesis within the given hypothetico-deductive setting. It is this particular set against which the hypothesis is tested. One can, therefore, say that the more empirical statements a hypothesis prohibits, i.e. the more it ventures, the more severely it is testable and the more it potentially explains. If at all, the testability (or falsifiability, depending on which view one takes) of a hypothesis can therefore only be measured by the content of the set of potential falsifiers. And, following Popper, the empirical content of a hypothesis can be equated to the degree of testability and the degree of falsifiability (sensu Popper 1983 Popper , 1994 . The degree of corroboration of a hypothesis is less dependent on the number of tests passed, which is equal to the total amount of supporting evidence, than on the severity of each test. The severity of the tests depends on the amount of accredited potential falsifiers, which in its turn depends on the degree of falsifiability or, in other words, on the degree of testability of the hypothesis which is directly dependent on its empirical content. Popper (1983: 245) proposes the convention that corroborability should equal testability and empirical content.
The empirical content is "a measure of the class of its falsifiers" (Popper 1983: 231) and the hypothesis with the 'larger' class of falsifiers is the hypothesis with the larger empirical content. (Popper 1994: 77, 211-218; 1983: 230, 244) The degree of corroboration a hypothesis gains by passing an empirical test can, therefore, be equated to the amount of potential falsifiers that are accredited by this test, and which constitute its severity.
Measuring the class of falsifiers of a hypothesis
In principle, it is not possible to give an absolute and objective measure of the degree of falsifiability of a hypothesis or the severity of a test. However, in some special cases a relative measure of the amount of falsifiers accredited by a test of two alternative hypotheses can be given. Hypothesis x has a higher degree of corroboration tha hypothesis y if -and only if -the class of possible falsifiers of hypothesis x includes the possible falsifiers of hypothesis y as a true subclass (Popper 1994: 80) and both hypotheses have passed the same severe test.
Unfortunately, this concept is not applicable to hypotheses of homology and synapomorphy, as they represent historical and therefore singular statements, and as every such hypothesis has its own and individual objectively incommensurable class of possible falsifiers. Thus, within a falsificationist approach, there is no strictly objective foundation for the introduction of a quantitative system to determine the severity of tests, the degrees of corroboration of hypotheses, or an a priori weighting system of cladistic characters, respectively. In this sense, Kluge is right when concluding that there is no theoretical basis for a priori character weighting within a falsificationist approach (Kluge 1997b) , and that an exact value for the degree of corroboration of a hypothesis cannot be determined (Kluge 1997a) .
Nevertheless, a priori weights have to be applied inevitably if one wants to perform a cladistic analysis on empirical grounds. Such weighting is either an equal or a differential weighting. Due to the fact that hypotheses of synapomorphy are tested against one another within the cladistic analysis, their respective degree of corroboration represents the decisive criterion in the case of conflict for the cladistic analysis (see above). The degrees of corroboration of those hypotheses of synapomorphy which have passed the test of identity are, therefore, compared with one another quantitatively. This comparison is immanent to any weighting scheme -whether equal or differential. For this reason one has to weight! So, we still have to ask what one should do. One should attempt to approximate the degrees of severity of each identity test.
One could categorize the possible falsifiers of a hypothesis into "classes of identity", classes of identical units of observation. The resulting number of classes would be directly dependent on the number of theoretically possible different results of a single mutation event. Because hypotheses of synapomorphy refer to mutation events, the possible falsifiers of these hypotheses, and therefore also the units of observation which come into question, have to refer to the possible results of the hypothesized mutation event.
For an 'empty' data matrix this would mean (Fig. 4 ) that, potentially, many different kinds of hypotheses of synapomorphy could be stated for every single position in a column of a matrix. Such a statement, for instance for site P 1 , position X 11 and an observable characteristic y, could look as follows: "X 11 is the result of a mutation event that has taken place in the last common ancestor of taxon 1 and all the other taxa that share the same type of character state y for the site P 1 of topographical correspondence". The statement would be falsified according to the criterion of identity if, and only if, X 11 y. Thus, the first test of synapomorphy is independent of the number and the sample of taxa used in the data matrix and the cladistic analysis. Falsifiers are all character states that are non-y, and the number of different falsifiers is determined by the number of possible character states of the corresponding mutation. An example for the classification into classes of identity can be taken from molecular data. For instance for a nucleotide substitution, every individual nucleotide is represented by its corresponding class of identity -A for adenine, G for guanine, C for cytosine, and T for thymine. One would thus receive three classes of observationally different, possible falsifiers for a given sequence position, because there are four possible results from any nucleotide substitution event. One of them would stand for the hypothesis and the remaining ones would be the potential falsifiers in the sense of the criterion of identity. With such a classification one can, at least in theory, measure the classes of possible different results of a mutation event quantitatively, thus measuring the number of classes of different falsifying statements for every hypothesis of synapomorphy. These classes of identity would be true subclasses of the class of all possible falsifiers of a hypothesis.
If one wishes to follow the convenient phylogenetic interpretation of Popper's falsificationist approach and, therefore, refuses to consider process probabilities as part of the relevant background knowledge, one could, as a 'null hypothesis', ascribe every such class of identity the same weight in terms of empirical content, which would lead to an equal weighting of these classes. This is, in my opinion, not a conclusive interpretation of Popper's approach, but I will follow it here because of its simplicity -one could also think of a probabilistic interpretation in terms of process probabilities of transformation events which would lead to an unequal weighting of these classes. Nevertheless, the severity of every test of identity could then be quantified, which would in turn quantify the degrees of corroboration of every hypothesis of synapomorphy that successfully passed the first test. These weights should be included in the cladistic test where the most parsimonious character state distribution for a given phylogeny is inferred (Fig. 5 gives an overview of the whole procedure, and Fig. 6 shows the relationships of the different concepts and terms applied in this procedure). In the case of two incongruent hy- potheses of synapomorphy, their degrees of corroboration from the first test give the basis to decide which hypothesis is to be preferred, i.e. which hypothesis has maximum explanatory power and which hypothesis should be reinterpreted ad hoc as a homoplasy. The degrees of all the other hypotheses of synapomorphy and their most parsimonious character state distribution must, of course, be taken into account to receive the globally most parsimonious solution.
Transferring this concept to the example of the 'empty' data matrix would lead to the following result: when the matrix has been 'filled' with empirical content derived from the character analysis, every position of a column entails only a part of one hypothesis of a putative synapomorphy. This means that, within this step, all other possible hypotheses of synapomorphy are excluded from this special site of topographical correspondence, and are hence falsified. When the character states are coded and filled into the data matrix the corresponding hypotheses of synapomorphy have therefore already passed the first test. The result of this test should be included in the data matrix by giving every cladistic character a weight corresponding to the severity of the passed test (or, in applying a step matrix, a weight for the corresponding transformation, respectively).
Many authors postulate the reduction of the background knowledge to descent with modification only to avoid other conditions relating to pattern and process. This facilitates the critical inference of other theories on the basis of the results of the phylogenetic inference without the problem of circular reasoning when, for instance, applying rates and patterns of character evolution (Kluge 1997a , see also Sluys 1996 . Giving each of the classes of identical falsifiers the same weight would agree with this claim.
One can thus summarize: the severity of the first synapomorphy test is dependent on the character type, which is the type of hypothesized transformation event,
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Org. Divers. Evol. (2002) 2, 319-333 Fig. 6 . Relations between the different concepts and terms applied in the procedure of cladistic research. The concepts of homology and synapomorphy are derived from descent with modification in which synapomorphy represents a special case of homology. Each of the two concepts consists of a theoretical definition and criteria of identification which in turn are test-criteria of putative homologies/synapomorphies. The two concepts, together with descent with modification, represent relevant background knowledge for the procedure of cladistic research. The two character concepts, phylogenetic and cladistic character, together with their two character states constitute the linkage between the empirical basis (the relevant observations) and the epistemic concepts of homology and synapomorphy. As such, they represent empiric arguments for the reconstruction of the genealogy of individual organisms or the reconstruction of the phylogeny of species, respectively. and on the number of different possible results. Besides, the following two assumptions have to be added to the relevant background knowledge: (1) character types can be classified according to the type of mutation/transformation which caused them and the constraints resulting from the inference of the topographical correspondence; and (2) the classes of observationally identical potential character states all have the same information content and are therefore weighted equally. The former is already necessary for stating a hypothesis of topographical correspondence, especially when analyzing molecular data. The latter represents a convention or a null hypothesis, respectively, which neglects the effect that the consideration of different process probabilities would have an effect on the outcome of the analysis. It is the crucial assumption of the entire weighting scheme that has been proposed and requires severe testing. However, the proposed classification at least provides a clear and unambiguous foundation for all kinds of different tests of a priori weighting systems and for discussing their advantages and disadvantages.
Complexity
Complexity is a term applied when interpreting characteristics, especially morphological characteristics. However, complexity depends on the individual eye of the observer. An event with a rather simple structure is often perceived as being very complex as long as one does not know its mechanics and causality. In this sense, complexity would be a concept extremely open to subjectivity, which belongs methodologically rather to description than to analysis.
If one wants to use the term complexity in the context of justifying weights of characters at all, it should be used in the sense of complexity of the transformation event to which the severity of the first test is related, rather than the complexity of the organismic structure of the characteristics (contradicting Neff 1986 , Patterson 1988 . One should not simply equate structural complexity with the complexity of an underlying event.
There is no theoretical nor methodological basis available yet for weighting characters simply according to their structural complexity within a refutationist program of phylogenetic inference.
Some authors (e.g., Wägele 1995 Wägele , 1996 state that the phylogenetic information content of a character state is higher when it is caused by a larger number of specific mutations, constituting a complex molecular character. This would represent a useful approach to character weighting as long as history, and thus evolution, ends after such a multitude of mutation events and all mutations take place in a single ancestor species only. However, if these two conditions are not met, it is difficult to treat such a 'composite character state' correctly. A single mutation event in only one of the positions where the former mutations occurred would already transform it into a new 'composite character state'. Much of the phylogenetic information would be lost in this type of character state coding (Fig. 7) . As a consequence, this new 'composite character state' has to be given the same weight as the old 'composite character state', since the former is the result of a multitude of mutation events in the same way as the latter, even though only a single mutation separates the apomorphic from its plesiomorphic condition. Hence, this newly transformed 'composite character state' would support only a single phylogenetic grouping -and with an artificially high weight -although phylogenetic information for another grouping is available. Information on, for instance, a sister group re- . Consequences and problems with the coding of results of multiple, independent transformation events as 'composite characters' or 'composite character states'. X and Y represent sister taxa, O the nearest related outgroup; p recodes three independent plesiomorphic character states which are represented by p 1 -p 3 ; q recodes three independent synapomorphic character states which are represented by q 1 -q 3 and which support the sister group relationship of the taxa X and Y; r recodes two synapomorphic character states which are represented by q 1 and q 2 and which support the sister group relationship of the taxa X and Y, and one autapomorphic character state r 1 which supports the monophyly of taxon X. When using the character states p 1 -p 3 , q 1 -q 3 and r 1 in a cladistic analysis, one would reconstruct the true phylogeny of X, Y and O. If one uses the recoded 'composite character states' p, q and r, one would not be able to reconstruct this relationship: although the 'composite character state' r supports the true monophyletic condition of taxon X, it is only a single transformation (r 1 ) that empirically supports this relationship and not three. This coding would, thus, lead to an artificially high weighting of r. The 'composite character state' q would support a monophyletic condition of taxon Y without any empirical evidence, and the sister group relationship of taxa X and Y is not at all supported by that type of character coding, in spite of the fact that empirical evidence (q 1 and q 2 ) does exist.
lationship could thus be lost (Fig. 7) . Furthermore, in the worst case, this coding could lead to support for artificial groupings. This problem can be caused when plesiomorphic and apomorphic character states are combined and form a 'composite character state'. And as the qualities 'plesiomorphic' and 'apomorphic' can only be assigned a posteriori to the cladistic analysis, such a 'composite character state' coding should be avoided whenever possible. The described problem affects morphological as well as molecular characters.
Final comments
To demonstrate that phylogenetic research is an empirical science sensu Popper, the empirical basis for tests of cladistic hypotheses has to be revealed, and thus their logical linkage to hypotheses of synapomorphy and homology. It is necessary to go back to the concept of homology to get as close as possible conceptually to the relevant empirical observations. The proposed concept of phylogenetic homology together with the criterion of identity represents a setting suitable for direct empirical testing within a falsificationist approach. This is due to the concept property of being related to the individual history of the organisms studied and to their corresponding genealogy. It utilizes the distribution pattern of identical and different characteristics of the investigated organisms to state hypotheses of the history of those characteristics and, therefore, indirectly of the organisms carrying them. Thus, from the reconstructed history of the characteristics one infers the history of the organisms bearing those characteristics, and from the latter the history of the corresponding species. By examining the structure of characteristics and hypothesizing specific types of transformations responsible for having caused them, a specific degree of severity is assigned to each identity test, and thus a specific degree of corroboration for every hypothesis that passes this test. Character analysis is, therefore, the step within the procedure of phylogenetic research during which a direct test on empirical observations is performed. This is the source from which cladistic hypotheses receive their empirical corroboration at the end of the analysis. This is why the potentially available amount of explanatory power for the presently most corroborated cladistic hypothesis is directly restricted to the quality and results of the character analysis.
Since hypotheses of homology do not represent cladistic hypotheses, the logical linkage of synapomorphy and homology has to be revealed. It is shown that they are not equivalent, but that the former represents a subclass of the latter. Putative synapomorphies can, therefore, also be empirically tested with the criterion of identity. This is very important, because otherwise the congruence test would not constitute an empirical test. Only where the hypotheses to be tested against each other have first passed an empirical test in which they gained corroboration, the congruence test is not an empirically empty one. And only in such cases are cladistic hypotheses empirically testable and is phylogenetic research an empirical science. This paper is also an attempt to evaluate the conditions for justifying a procedure within a falsificationist approach to phylogeny, that is intimately linked to the circumstances stated above: the necessity to weight cladistic characters within a cladistic analysis.
And as the congruence criterion tests hypotheses of synapomorphy against each other on grounds of their degree of corroboration gained from the identity test, these different degrees of corroboration determine the specific weights given to cladistic characters and character state transformations before the cladistic analysis. This is the only reasonable justification for a weighting scheme and it also demonstrates the indispensable necessity of its application. There is no non-weighting but only a priori weighting of cladistic characters in a falsificationist approach to phylogeny.
A convention had to be set up to classify cladistic characters in correspondence with the transformation type that has caused them, as well as a convention to classify character states with respect to their identity. This is not problematic since it does not affect a possible weighting scheme directly. To be able to justify a weighting scheme, a proposal has to be stated to the effect that every class of possible identical character states has the same weight in terms of its explanatory power and empirical content. This is a problematic proposal, since it disregards any effect of different process probabilities of transformations and requires severe testing on empirical data. A first test is presented in Vogt (2002, this volume) .
On the whole, however, the advantage of the proposed scheme lies in its clearly and unequivocally stated assumptions. This enables one to discuss them and their alternatives as well as their impact on the methods of cladistic analysis.
As a consequence of the present investigation, the background knowledge that necessarily has to be assumed in every cladistic inference that corresponds with a falsificationist approach can be summarized as follows:
1) logical sentence of contradiction 2) methodological criterion of parsimony 3) descent with modification, including knowledge about reproduction, heredity, speciation and mutation/ recombination 4) determination of the relevant area of matter (domain of discourse), including the assumption of the ob-servability of characteristics, the categorization of identical character states into classes of identity, and the assignment of the classes of identity to specific types of mutations/recombinations 5) the proposal to weight all classes of identity equally in terms of determining the severity of the identity test (if one wishes to follow the conventional interpretation of Popper's falsificationism in phylogenetic research).
When considering morphological data, the necessity of assumption 4), in particular, gives reason for wellfounded concern. We still have very little knowledge of the genetic linkage and of the mechanisms of transformation of morphological characteristics. This knowledge is, however, fundamental to being able to interpret the phylogenetic information content of morphological characteristics and thus to performing a more or less effective cladistic analysis within the falsificationist approach. Another problem is the necessity of developing a methodology that allows a more objective description of morphological characteristics, so as to be able to test them more severely on identity. A cladistic analysis of morphological data is, therefore, only reasonable in those cases where the number of homoplasies after character analysis is very low and the general phylogenetic information content thus comparatively high. Even though this sounds like a serious blow, there still are a number of promising approaches to the possibility of evaluating the quality of morphological characteristics methodologically within the character analysis (e.g. Neff 1986 ). This aspect will require further investigation.
